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1.	Introduction.		If	an	ecological	democracy	is	a	type	of	democracy	focused	on	socionatural	relations,	it	is	safe	to	say	that	no	contemporary	discussion	of	the	subject	can	avoid	the	hypothesis	that	best	summarizes	the	current	state	of	such	relations:	the	Anthropocene.	Of	course,	the	Anthropocene	itself	is	far	from	being	a	peaceful	theoretical	domain:	its	plausibility,	meanings	and	implications	are	hotly	debated.	Yet	its	impact	on	environmental	political	theory	is	undeniable	and	it	looks	likely	that	the	concept	is	going	to	stay	with	us	for	a	long	time.	It	actually	poses	a	challenge	for	environmental	political	theory,	as	it	describes	a	global	state	of	socionatural	relations	that	confirms	the	degree	to	which	social	and	natural	systems	 are	 coupled	 and	 thus	 constitute	 a	 socionatural	 entanglement	 rather	 than	 two	 different	entities	engaged	in	mutual	but	limited	relations.	In	this	regard,	it	collects	a	number	of	assumptions	that	remained	more	or	less	disconnected	-from	climate	change	to	the	end	of	nature-	and	provides	us	a	with	a	new,	more	realistic	framework	for	discussing	socionatural	relations	and	the	prospects	for	sustainability.		But	what	does	the	Anthropocene	involve	for	ecological	democracy?	That	is	to	say,	for	the	prospects	of	an	ecological	democracy	-since	the	green	ideal	of	what	an	ecological	democracy	is	has	been	widely	theorized	but	never	realized.	How	should	we	think	of	ecological	democracy	in	the	Anthropocene?	Or,	more	to	the	point,	can	we	even	think	of	an	ecological	democracy	for	the	Anthropocene,	that	takes	the	Anthropocene	as	both	its	context	and	its	subject?	The	necessity	of	such	reflection	becomes	clear	if	we	consider	how	useless	an	ecological	democracy	that	 ignores	the	Anthropocene	would	be	-an	ecological	democracy,	then,	that	prefers	to	ignore	the	irreversible	anthropogenic	influence	on	Earth	or	confines	itself	to	a	local	level	or	embrace	a	classical	approach	to	environmental	management:	as	if	nothing	had	happened.		Contrariwise,	the	Anthropocene	is	a	challenge	that	has	to	be	confronted.	Even	if	we	conclude	that	the	 Anthropocene	 cannot	 be	 democratized,	 nor	 can	 an	 ecological	 democracy	 suited	 for	 this	overarching	reality	be	organized.	That	would	not	be	completely	surprising.	After	millennia	of	seeing	political	 regimes	 as	 intra-human	 affairs,	 the	 Anthropocene	 forces	 us	 "to	 embark	 on	 a	 deep	reconceptualisation	of	political	agency	and	democracy"	(Hamilton,	Bonneuil	&	Gemenne,	2015:	9).	In	 fact,	 as	 we	 shall	 see,	 the	 very	 agency	 of	 democracy	 as	 a	 transformative	 power	 should	 be	reconceptualised.	In	this	regard,	the	greatest	theoretical	danger	lies	in	a	vaguely	utopian	thinking	that	makes	 open	 statements	 about	 a	 future	 ecological	 democracy	without	 actually	being	 precise	about	the	institutional	arrangements	or	the	decision-making	process	that	the	former	would	entail.	Jeremiah	Purdy,	for	instance,	has	rightly	argued	that		"The	 Anthropocene	 question	 -what	 kind	 of	 world	 to	 make	 together-	 should	 be	 taken	 as	 a	 challenge	 to	democracy.	 The	 question	 is	 whether	 citizens	 can	 form	 the	 kind	 of	 democracy	 that	 can	 address	 the	Anthropocene	question,	the	question	of	what	world	to	make"	(Purdy	2015:	267).		In	other	words,	the	question	is	whether	citizens	-Western	ones	to	begin	with-	can	react	to	the	news	that	 scientists	 are	 communicating	 about	 the	 Anthropocene.	 As	we	 become	 aware	 of	 our	 role	 as	ecological	agents	at	a	global	level,	new	reponsibilities	emerge	that	force	us	to	act	as	stewards	of	the	Earth	system	(see	Steffen	et	al.	2007).	For	that	very	reason,	the	Anthropocene	can	said	to	possess	a	moral	core:	if	we	have	no	choice	but	to	live	in	some	Anthropocene,	our	current	choices	will	have	an	influence	on	the	shape	of	the	future,	so	that	we	can	choose	to	some	extent	which	Anthropocene	is	it	going	to	be	(Ellis	&	Trachtenberg	2013).	How	effective	that	influence	can	actually	be,	is	a	matter	of	
controversy.	Yet	if	we	talk	of	human	choices,	democracy	must	be	taken	into	account:	although	most	individual	choices	are	not	formally	connected	to	democratic	processes,	all	of	them	take	place	within	a	democratic	society	and	are	made	by	an	individual	whose	subjectivity	has	been	-at	least	partially-	shaped	by	it.		What	a	world	to	make	together	is	thus	a	question	that	can	only	be	answered	in	a	democracy.	Purdy	adds	 that	 only	 a	 democracy	 capable	 of	 self-restraint	 can	 truly	 solve	 this	 problem:	 only	 a	 self-restraining	democracy	could	serve	as	a	democracy	in	or	for	the	Anthropocene.	But	such	claim	is	a	normative	one,	since	he	is	already	choosing	which	decisions	must	democracy	make:	a	democracy	oriented	to	self-restraint	is	thus	a	self-restraint	democracy.	Leaving	aside	the	question	of	whether	this	is	the	only	or	even	the	most	likely	societal	answer	to	the	Anthropocene	challenge,	Purdy	(2015:	268)	 ends	 up	 by	 acknowledging	 that	 "no	 one	 really	 knows	 what	 a	 democray	 on	 the	 scale	 of	Anthropocene	 challenges	 (...)	 would	 look	 like".	 Moreover,	 no	 one	 knows	 how	 to	 make	 that	democracy	 a	 self-restraint	 one	 either.	 Somehow	 it	 is	 presumed	 that	 such	 political	 shifts	will	 be	brought	about	by	a	sudden	change	in	collective	perception,	as	the	prospects	for	human	survival	or	welfare	become	obviously	endangered	in	the	new	geological	epoch.		This	must	be	too	complacent,	but	certainly	there	is	not	much	that	can	be	done.	Sustainabiity	and	environmental	conservation	are	not	today	a	greater	social	priority	than	they	were	a	decade	ago.	In	fact,	 the	 Great	 Recession	 has	 shown	 how	 quickly	 "materialist"	worries	 can	 return	 in	 the	 face	 of	economic	hardships	or	 increased	national	 inequalities.	An	ecological	democracy	 looks	 today	 less	unlikely	 than	 ever.	 However,	 environmental	 political	 theory	 itself	 has	 no	 choice	 but	 to	 keep	 on	thinking	about	it.	That	is	what	this	papers	tries	to	do,	dedicated	as	it	is	to	elucidate	what	democracy	in	the	Anthropocene	might	mean	and	what	shape,	if	any,	should	it	take.		
2.	Democratizing	the	Anthropocene	(I):	
democracy	as	decision.		How	do	 democracy	 and	 the	Anthropocene	 relate	 to	 each	 other?	Does	 it	make	 sense	 to	 talk	 of	 a	democratic	Anthropocene?	In	principle,	such	proposition	seems	ludicrous.	The	Anthropocene	is	a	state	of	socionatural	relations	that,	in	turn,	is	produced	by	a	great	number	of	long-lived	material	and	cultural	processes.	As	such,	 it	does	not	 look	like	a	democratic	object	-like	an	issue	about	which	a	
demos	can	decide.	But	even	if	that	is	not	the	case,	what	would	that	demos	exactly	be?	Does	it	include	actants,	 citizens	 from	 all	 over	 the	 world,	 future	 generations?	 If	 so,	 what	 kind	 of	 democratic	institutions	are	needed	and	how	could	their	decisions	be	implemented?	Such	are	the	interrogations	that	a	democratic	Anthropocene	suggests.		Basically,	 there	 are	 two	 dimensions	 to	 be	 considered,	 each	 of	 them	 representing	 two	 different	approaches	to	the	Anthropocene	as	an	object	of	public	decision:	democratizing	the	Anthropocene	meaning	 either	 subjecting	 it	 to	 a	 system	 of	 governance	 or	 fostering	 a	 politically	 charged	 public	conversation	about	the	good	Anthropocene.	To	put	it	differently:	democracy	as	decision	as	opposed	to	democracy	as	conversation.	These	dimensions	can	coexist	-they	should,	in	fact,	complement	each	other.	 And	 although	 they	 actually	 do	 so	 already	 in	 Western	 democracies,	 complex	 modern	economies	 show	 the	 limitations	 that	 affect	 politics	 when	 trying	 to	 achieve	 desirable	 ends	 that	nobody	would	object	to:	from	full	employment	to	high	wages.	Political	willingness	is	not	the	same	as	political	efficacy	and	sometimes	the	former	can	even	frustrates	the	latter.	Therefore,	democracy	as	conversation	and	democracy	as	decision	can	tragically	diverge	-and	they	often	do	so.		The	Anthropocene	might	be	a	difficult	object	as	well.	Any	attempt	to	design	an	ecological	democracy	
for	the	Anthropocene	must	thus	first	reflect	upon	a	number	of	theoretical	problems	arising	from	the	peculiar	nature	of	the	latter.	To	be	sure,	the	Anthropocene	deepens	some	of	the	problems	that	have	traditionally	 afflicted	 sustainability	 -or	 the	 prospect	 of	 a	 sustainability	 both	 democratic	 and	effective-	such	as	the	divergence	between	social	and	natural	temporalities,	or	the	contrast	between	a	predominantly	national	democracy	and	global	environmental	phenomena.	Moreover,	new	issues	
emerge	concerning	agency	(a	looser	distribution	of	it	among	a	greater	number	of	human	and	non-human	 actors),	 intentionality	 (since	 all	 kinds	 of	 unintended	 actions	 and	 effects	 can	 be	 said	 to	contribute	to	the	making	of	the	Anthropocene),	and	responsibility	(insofar	as	such	a	wider	notion	can	 actually	 prevent	 the	 recognition	 that	 different	 actors	 possess	 different	 power	 and	 hence	disparate	 responsibilities	 in	 "creating"	 the	 Anthropocene,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 a	 non-human	production	of	the	latter	can	also	be	advocated).	Finally,	some	classical	democratic	problems	must	be	considered,	 such	 as	 sovereignity	 (how	 potent	 are	 the	 democratic	 decisions	 in	 the	 case	 of	 such	complex	object)	and	the	demos	(who	belong	to	it	if	agentic	capabilities	are	loosely	distributed).	A	portrait	of	the	Anthropocene	as	an	elusive	object	for	a	decision-based	democracy	emerges	from	this	discussion.		
2.1.	The	problem	of	sovereignity.			If	a	democracy	makes	decisions,	these	decisions	must	be	effective:	otherwise	we	would	be	dealing	with	a	powerless	and	hence	a	useless	democracy.	From	an	environmental	point	of	view,	this	might	certainly	be	a	reason	for	endorsing	non-democratic	regimes,	as	eco-authoritarianism	did	back	in	the	70s.	It	could	also	be	the	case	that	a	general	case	for	the	green	Leviathan	could	be	made	in	the	face	of	ecological	 collapse	 -but	 this	moment	has	not	 arrived.	Besides,	 there	 are	no	 guarantees	 that	 eco-authoritarianism	would	perform	better	than	democracies:	if	sustainable	policies	lead	to	economic	stagnation,	for	instance,	citizens	might	not	accept	it	so	easily.	Nevertheless,	what	must	be	asked	first	is	whether	human	collectivities	can	make	meaningful	decisions	about	the	Anthropocene.	Needless	to	 say,	 non-democratic	 politics	 offer	 some	 advantages,	 as	 individual	 rights	 and	 liberties	 can	 be	violated	and	thus	more	extreme	political	measures	can	be	adopted.	Yet	it	is	ecological	democracy	that	we	shall	discuss,	for	in	democratic	societies	we	live.		Ironically,	it	could	be	argued	that	democratic	powers	vis-à-vis	the	Anthropocene	have	not	yet	been	tested	and	therefore	we	do	not	know	what	they	could	achieve,	since	it	has	never	been	targeted	as	a	democratic	object.	As	Steven	Vogel	puts	it:		"The	environment	we	currently	inhabit	is	as	bad	as	it	is	-as	dangerous,	as	toxic,	as	ugly-	not	because	anyone	decided	to	build	it	that	way	but	because	no	decision	was	made	at	all:	and	so	the	shape	of	the	environment	is	left	 as	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 anarchic	 process	 that	 result	 when	 millions	 of	 individuals	 engage	 in	 private	transactions	without	any	ability	to	decide	publically	and	communally	what	they	want	that	shape	to	be"	(Vogel	2016:	157).		To	set	up	a	democracy	for	the	Anthropocene	would	thus	mean	to	include	the	latter	into	the	former's	range,	to	start	taking	decisions	that	address	it	directly.	It	is	only	by	doing	this	that	we	shall	discover	whether	democracy	is	up	to	the	task.	As	of	yet	we	do	not	know	whether	democracy	can	be	sovereign	when	deciding	upon	the	Anthropocene,	whether	it	can	make	decisions	that	really	influence	the	kind	of	Anthropocene	we	will	inhabit.	Hence	Purdy's	plea	to	keep	in	view	a	picture		"of	 a	 world	 in	 which	 Anthropocene	 questions	 would	 be	 genuinely	 democratic.	 In	 that	 world,	 self-aware,	collective	engagement	with	the	question	of	what	kinds	of	landscapes,	what	kind	of	atmosphere	and	climate,	and	what	kind	of	world-shaping	habitation	to	pursue	would	all	be	parts	of	the	repertoire	of	self-governance"	(Purdy	2015:	269).		However,	a	problem	of	incongruity	comes	up.	On	the	one	hand,	we	have	a	particular	decision	system	that	 requires	 the	 consent	 of	 everyone	 involved;	 on	 the	 other,	 a	 complex	 and	 ultimately	 global	socionatural	phenomena	whose	very	occurrence	is	a	side-effect	of	social	development	and	not	the	product	of	any	political	decision.	To	a	great	extent,	 in	fact,	 the	Anthropocene	has	been	caused	by	unintentional	actions,	as	a	result	of	the	adaptive	process	of	the	species.	Adapting	to	the	environment	is	certainly	not	something	that	can	be	voted,	but	how	to	adapt	to	it	is	at	this	point	-at	least	to	some	extent-	something	that	could	be	decided	upon.	Now	that	socionatural	relations	are	examined	and	bound	 to	 be	 re-arranged	 in	 the	 search	 for	 sustainability,	 it	 makes	 sense	 to	 consider	 how	 do	
democracy	 and	 the	 Anthropocene	 relate	 to	 each	 other,	 i.e.	 how	 sovereign	 a	 decision	 about	 the	Anthropocene	can	actually	be.		What	 can	 be	 democratically	 decided	 when	 deciding	 about	 the	 Anthropocene?	 Timothy	 Morton	(2013)	has	 talked	of	 "hyperobjects"	 to	 refer	 to	 things	 that	are	massively	distributed	 in	 time	and	space	 relative	 to	humans.	Examples	 include	 the	biosphere	or	a	black	hole,	but	also	 some	human	manufactures	 such	 as	 the	 sum	 of	 all	 plastics.	 They	 are	 not	 local,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 their	 local	manifestations	are	not	them,	and	involve	different	temporalities	than	the	human-scale	ones	we	are	usted	 to	 deal	with.	 The	 Anthropocene	 is	 an	 hyperobject	 itself,	 or	 at	 least	 it	 stands	 for	 a	 related	network	 of	 hyperobjects	 such	 as	 climate	 change	 or	 socionatural	 hybridization.	 A	 problem	 with	hyperobjects	is	that	they	are	so	vast	both	spatially	and	temporally	that	their	representations	"cannot	evoke	the	feelings	of	urgency	in	individuals	or	political	collectivities	that	might	translate	into	action"	(Frost	2016:	186).	At	the	same	time,	the	notion	that	a	democratic	assembly	could	stand	in	front	of	any	of	these	hyperobjects	and	make	meaningful	decisions	about	them	seems	moot.		A	first	caution	regarding	ecological	democracy	in	the	Anthropocene,	and	a	key	one,	thus	concerns	the	scope	and	ability	of	such	a	political	regime.	Facing	the	Anthropocene	 in	 toto	and	 its	different	manifestations,	a	democracy	cannot	make	fully	sovereign	and	effective	decisions	-on	the	contrary,	it	is	 constrained	 in	 its	 decision-making	 capacities.	 This	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 arguing	 that	 ecological	democracy	in	the	Anthropocene	is	unfeasible	or	irrelevant,	but	to	acknowledge	that	its	powers	are	limited	and	hence	so	should	our	expectations	about	its	transformative	force.		Therefore,	political	decisions	in	this	realm	cannot	be	but	decisions	oriented	to	influence	the	course	of	 the	Anthropocene,	 that	 is,	 they	can	be	decisions	about	 the	way	 in	which	society	relates	 to	 the	environment	in	particular	aspects	-but	not	direct	decisions	on	material	processes	and	phenomena	that	cannot	be	so	easily	politicized.	Besides,	these	kind	of	'decisions'	reveal	the	relative	impotence	of	politics.	No	matter	how	much	sovereignity	it	claims	to	have,	democracy	cannot	always	achieve	what	it	would	like	to	achieve:	climate	change	cannot	be	easily	stopped,	biophysical	systems	cannot	be	replaced.	Much	can	be	done,	however,	not	least	because	science	is	providing	human	beings	with	new	powers	of	intervention	and	manipulation.	Yet	whether	that	what	can	be	done	is	democratically	doable	 is	 another	 matter.	 Coordinating	 so	 many	 actors,	 epistemic	 processes,	 technological	innovations	 and	 social	 interactions	with	 the	 environment	 at	 so	many	 different	 levels,	 as	well	 as	fostering	the	necessary	shift	in	social	values	and	practices	-that	is	arguably	an	impossible	task.	An	incremental,	 piecemeal	 approach	 seems	 thus	 more	 advisable.	 That	 is	 why	 environmental	
governance	seems	more	appropriate	than	an	all-encompassing	anthropocenic	democracy.	Or	at	least	more	appropriate	 than	a	 formal,	 institutionalized	 system	of	democratic	decision-making	directly	focused	on	the	Anthropocene.		
2.2.	The	problem	of	scale.		Any	 attempt	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 Anthropocene	 -either	 democratically	 or	 through	 a	 system	 of	institutional	 governance-	 faces	 an	 inescapable	 obstacle:	 its	 global	 nature.	 Although	 it	 can	 be	decomposed	 in	 a	 number	 of	 local	 and	 national	 socio-ecological	 regimes,	 the	 Anthropocene	 is	ultimately	 a	 global	 phenomena	 that	 demands	 planetary	 solutions	 or	 at	 least	 the	 coordinated	aggregation	of	national	and	regional	ones.	Hence	the	much-discussed	idea	of	setting	up	planetary	boundaries	 for	 creating	 a	 "safe	 space"	 for	 humanity	 (see	 Röckstrom	 2008).	 In	 this	 regard,	 few	problems	have	been	more	 recurrent	 in	 the	history	of	 democracy	 than	 scale.	On	 the	one	hand,	 it	constraints	the	effectiveness	of	deliberation	and	reduces	the	chances	for	direct	(formal)	individual	participation;	on	the	other,	as	far	as	global	issues	are	concerned,	it	demands	coordination	between	states	or	even	the	creation	of	transnational	bodies	of	decision	that,	in	turn,	are	affected	by	problems	of	 legitimacy,	 given	 the	 absence	of	 a	 global	demos	 and	 the	 lack	 -so	 far-	 of	 a	 strong	 global	 public	opinion.		Arguably,	the	Anthropocene	itself	may	contribute	to	the	gradual	constitution	of	a	global	subject	that	is	 likely	 in	 the	making,	 thanks	 to	 the	 combination	 of	 globalization	 (social	 processes	 that	 create	
mutual	 interdependences)	 and	digitization	 (new	 tools	of	 communication	 that	 change	both	 social	perceptions	and	individual	relations).	By	gathering	apparently	disparate	socionatural	phenomena	and	showing	that	they	all	are	affecting	the	global	environment	upon	which	every	human	being	on	Earth	 depends	 (despite	 the	 fact	 that	 socioeconomic	 inequalities	 matter,	 for	 instance	 providing	different	resources	for	adapting	to	the	rise	of	global	temperatures),	the	Anthropocene	makes	clear	that	a	global	management	of	this	shared	environment	is	inescapable.	For	Schellnhuber	(1999),	the	global	 subject	will	be	 'produced'	by	 the	very	 technologies	 that	have	also	 facilitated	 the	 scientific	models	and	representations	that	are	ushering	a	second	Copernican	revolution	grounded	on	Earth-system	science:	global	telecommunication	will	ultimately	establish	a	cooperative	system	generating	values,	 preferences	 and	 decisions	 as	 crucial	 commonalities	 of	 humanity	 online.	 However,	 this	 is	more	akin	to	environmental	governance	than	to	ecological	democracy.	And	global	environmental	governance	is	problematic	from	the	viewpoint	of	democracy	and	justice	(Dryzek	2016).	Then	again,	if	governance	can	do	things	that	ecological	democracy	cannot	maybe	this	is	a	lesser	evil.		Admittedly,	the	social	response	to	the	Anthropocene	does	not	have	to	operate	exclusively	under	the	logic	of	globalism.	On	the	contrary,	the	aggregated	view	of	Earth-system	science	can	be	detrimental	to	 the	application	of	particular,	 situated	solutions	 that	 take	 local	knowledge	and	experience	 into	account.	It	can	certainly	be	detached	from	the	different	geographies	of	personal	or	collective	culture	and	history	(Hulme	2010:	5).	An	Earth-system	perspective	can	easily	lead	to	a	totalizing	vision	that	results	in	managerial	schemes	that	erase	different	viewpoints	or	alternative	experiences	of	nature	(Liftin	1997:	38).	Therefore,	ineffective	as	they	may	be	in	a	wider	context,	local	democratic	practices	can	make	sense	in	order	to	solve	local	problems.	But	in	turn,	the	lack	of	global	coordination	may	result	in	a	diminished	sovereignity.		The	question	is	thus	how	to	combine	democracy,	globality,	and	efficacy.	In	other	words,	how	to	make	meaningful	democratic	decisions	that	match	the	scope	of	the	Anthropocene	and	are	effective	enough	to	 make	 a	 difference	 -and	 to	 make	 sense	 at	 all.	 This	 is	 not	 easy;	 maybe	 it	 is	 unfeasible.	 If	 the	Anthropocene	 requires	 that	 government	 is	 thought	 in	 terms	 of	 geopolitics,	 i.e.	 of	 Gaia-politics	(Hamilton,	Bonneuil	&	Gemenne	2015:	10),	so	that	the	Earth	itself	becomes	a	political	subject,	the	lack	of	a	democratic	Weltstaat	 forces	us	 to	defer	 to	governance,	which	 in	 the	case	of	democratic	states	possesses	at	least	an	indirect	democratic	legitimacy.	Likewise,	scale	has	always	determined	democratic	possibilities:	the	greater	the	size	of	a	community,	the	more	delegative	its	politics	must	be.	There	are	several	reasons	for	this,	ranging	from	the	conditions	for	meaningful	deliberation	to	the	complexity	of	decisions	themselves.	In	any	event,	the	monstruous	scale	of	the	Anthropocene	seems	to	obstruct	the	way	towards	ecological	democracy	and	points	instead	to	the	more	modest	virtues	of	environmental	governance.		
2.3.	The	problem	of	agency.		Who	makes	 the	Anthropocene?	To	 answer	 this	 question	 is	 a	 necessity	 for	 ecological	 democracy,	since	only	by	doing	so	can	causal	factors	be	tracked	down	and	the	corresponding	responsibilities	be	attributed.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	Anthropocene,	 though,	mapping	 agency	 does	 not	 provide	 clear-cut	solutions	 but	 new	 intrincacies	 that	 further	 complicates	 ecological	 democracy's	 prospects.	 This	happens	because	realising	the	complexity	of	agency	in	the	Anthropocene	does	not	only	affect	the	identification	of	causes	and	the	attribution	of	responsibilities	-it	also	concerns	the	ability	to	act	in	order	to	stop,	reshape	or	mitigate	it.	And	all	the	more	if	we	take	a	democratic	viewpoint,	given	that	the	 action	or	 influence	of	 some	agents	 are	not	 easily	democratized	nor	 subjected	 to	 an	 effective	political	control.		The	very	origins	of	the	Anthropocene,	seen	in	historical	rather	than	evolutionary	terms,	show	how	misleading	abstract	concepts	can	be.	 It	has	been	argued	that	 the	Anthropocene	misattributes	the	causes	 of	 environmental	 degradation	 to	 all	 of	 “mankind”,	 blaming	 so-called	 universal	 “human	nature”	for	problems	wrought	by	the	actions	of	particular	subsets	of	the	world’s	people	(Malm	and	Hornborg	2014).	As	Peter	Sloterdijk	puts	it,	the	"humanity"	we	often	talk	consists	actually	of	that	limited	number	of	actors	who,	in	the	Europe	of	the	eighteenth	and	nineteenth	century,	developed	a	
number	of	techniques	that	combined	a	new	socionatural	arrangement	with	a	universal	discourse	that	rested	upon	the	idea	of	progress.	So	that:		"When	Crutzen	speaks	about	the	'Anthropocene',	he	does	so	with	Dutch	courtesy	-or	an	aversion	to	conflict.	It	would	be	more	appropriate	to	talk	of	an	'Eurocene'	or	of	a	'Technocene'	originated	in	Europe"	(Sloterdijk	2016:	10).		In	doing	so,	the	Anthropocene	concept	allegedly	overlooks	the	“inequalities,	alienation,	and	violence	inscribed	in	modernity’s	strategic	relations	of	power	and	production”	and	thus	blocks	possibilities	for	radical	politics	(Moore,	2014:	2).	The	true	geologic	actor	in	this	new	epoch,	these	social	scientists	assert,	 is	 imperial	 capitalism,	 not	 some	 abstract	 “humanity”.	 Thus,	 in	 lieu	 of	 the	 term	“Anthropocene”,	 several	 scholars	 have	 proposed	 the	 “Capitalocene”	 as	 a	more	 apt	 name	 for	 this	epoch	 (Moore,	 2014).	 Others,	 such	 as	 Donna	 Haraway,	 refuse	 to	 be	 trapped	 in	 the	 alternative	presented	 by	 Anthropocene	 and	 Capitalocene,	 arguinhg	 instead	 that	 we	 should	 talk	 of	 a	"Chthulucene"	-a	denomination	that	goes	beyond	human	exceptionalism	and	bounded	individualism	and	tries	to	show	that	"Western-indebted	people	can	no	longer	figure	themselves	as	individuals	and	societies	 of	 individuals	 in	 human-only	 societies"	 (Haraway	 2016:	 30-31).	 Two	 different	 agency-related	 problems	 thus	 arise	 in	 connection	 to	 the	 Anthropocene:	 humanity	 as	 a	 flawed	 causal	category	and	the	unrecognized	participation	of	non-human	forces.		This	 is	a	complex	matter.	Dipesh	Chakrabarty	has	argued	that	processes	belonging	to	the	deeper	history	of	Earth	and	life	are	co-actors	in	the	current	crisis.	In	a	controversy	with	Slavoj	Zizek,	who	defends	the	Capitalocene	thesis	and	thus	blames	capitalism	as	a	destructive	force,	Chakrabarty	has	retorted	that		"to	say	that	the	history	and	logic	of	particular	human	institutions	have	become	caught	up	in	the	much	larger	processes	of	the	Earth	system	and	evolutionary	history	(...)	is	not	to	say	that	human	history	is	the	driver	of	these	large-scale	process"	(Chakrabarty	2015:	54).		From	a	deep	time	perspective,	then,	capitalism	is	anecdotal.	It	could	even	be	argued	that	targetting	capitalism	 is	 a	 way	 of	 reducing	 events	 that	 go	 beyond	 human	 experience	 to	 epistemologically	manageable	 terms	 -we	 see	 ourselves	 as	 protagonists	 and	 hence	 the	 "Anthropocene"	 label.	What	Chakrabarty	suggests	is	that	the	latter	can	partly	be	explained	by	factors	that	cannot	be	controlled	nor	held	accountable	by	democratic	institutions.	However,	he	sees	human	beings	are	actors	as	well	and	defends	that	"the	story	of	our	necessarily	divided	human	lives	has	to	be	supplemented	by	the	story	of	our	collective	life	as	a	species"	(Chakrabarty	2015:	49)	-a	split	between	two	histories	that	the	category	of	population	conjoins.		This	last	point	is	a	relevant	one.	Because	even	if	attributing	agency	to	"mankind"	is	a	way	of	hiding	the	special	protagonism	that	some	social	groups	in	certain	contexts	have	possessed,	the	lens	of	the	historian	must	 be	 supplemented	 by	 those	 of	 the	 evolutionary	 theorist	who	 think	 of	 the	 human	species	-or	human	populations-	as	causal	units.	After	all,	we	are	talking	about	the	human	species,	whose	exceptional	way	of	being	features	an	aggressive	adaptation	to	the	environment	that	is	both	colonizing	and	transformative	(yet	not	always	intentional).	Such	adaptive	efforts	may	be	leaded	by	certain	groups	or	countries	or	individuals,	but	technological	and	institutional	novelties	are	spread	among	populations.	Virginie	Maris	summarizes	the	problem:		"Cultural	 and	 biological	 agents	 are	 individuals	 or,	 at	 least,	 social	 groups.	 The	 idea	 that	 humans	 could	 be	geological	agents	refers	to	human	as	species.	Individual	or	small	group	behaviours	cannot	interfere	with	the	great	geological	processes"	(Maris	2015:	129).		For	her,	this	is	a	problem	for	democracy	insofar	as	such	an	abstract	global	story	can	hardly	motivate	local	 political	 action,	 especially	 since	 individuals	 are	 disposessed	 of	 their	 ability	 to	 feel	morally	responsible	 and	 become	 actors	 in	 the	 solutions.	 The	 conundrum	 is	 that	 the	 human	 species	 has	brought	about	-or	contributed	to	produce-	geological	changes	about	which	individual	members	of	
that	species	are	supposed	to	decide	in	a	democratic	way.	A	further	complication	concerns	the	flawed	sovereignity	 of	 ecological	 democracy	 in	 the	 Anthropocene,	 as	 the	 brute	 force	 of	 population	behaviour	over	time	cannot	be	fully	replicated	by	political	decisions	in	complex,	divided	societies.	Ironically,	 some	 geoscientists	 welcome	 the	 opportunity	 that	 the	 Anthropocene	 provides	 for	politicizing	geology	-by	bringing	power,	colonial	histories	or	human	inequalities	into	the	pages	of	scientific	journals	and	thus	complicating	conventional	stories	about	"mankind"	(see	Swanson	2016).	But	a	constructive	critique	does	not	translate	easily	into	effective	decisions.		On	the	other	hand,	there	is	the	problem	that	relates	to	the	fact	that	"things	have	politics",	as	Marres	(2013)	 puts	 it.	 If	 we	 understand	 politics	 as	 something	 that	 goes	 beyond	 the	 human	 realm	 to	encompass	all	those	actions	that	make	a	difference	in	the	world,	certainly	human	individuals	are	not	the	only	ones	that	take	part	on	it.	New	materialists	thinkers	have	been	making	this	claim	for	some	time	now,	mostly	on	 the	basis	provided	by	Bruno	Latour's	 (1993)	Actor-Network	Theory,	which	makes	 a	 distinction	 between	 human	actors	 and	 non-human	actants.	 As	 both	 are	 said	 to	 possess	agentic	capacities,	all	kinds	of	non-human	beings	and	entities	become,	 if	not	actors,	actants:	 they	produce	effects	and	affects,	influence	human	actors	by	encouraging	or	blocking	them,	alter	a	given	course	of	events,	etc.	Jane	Bennett	(2010)	has	proposed	an	"enchanted	materialism"	where	matter	is	vital	and	active	rather	than	passive	and	submissive	to	human	ends.	Germs	would	be	actants,	as	well	as	particular	 technologies:	 the	car,	 for	 instance.	Likewise,	climate	change	 -by	 forcing	human	beings	to	adapt-	could	also	count	as	such.	Thus	Bennet's	talk	of	an	"interfolding	network	of	humanity	and	nonhumanity"	that	produces	the	social	world	and	shape	socionatural	relations.		In	short,	human	beings	do	not	hold	a	monopoly	on	agency.		Yet	how	to	translate	this	into	democratic	language?	To	begin	with,	there	is	nothing	"democratic"	in	such	 agentic	 distribution.	 Likewise,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 conceive	 of	 ways	 in	 which	 actants	 can	 be	incorporated	into	the	democratic	process,	despite	some	proposals	that	center	around	their	proxy	representation	by	humans	(Goodin	1996,	Eckersley	2000).	But	how	can	climate	change	be	politically	represented?	What	about	virus	or	technologies?	The	challenge	for	ecological	democracy	is	plain.	As	is	the	disjuncture	between	the	relevant	actors/actants	and	the	demos	of	such	a	democracy.	If	things	other	than	humans	make	a	difference,	while	are	also	affected	in	turn	by	human	actions,	who	belong	to	the	demos	of	an	ecological	democracy	in	the	Anthropocene?		Incorporating	non-human	actants	to	the	demos	 is	easier	said	than	done.	Although	their	relevance	has	to	be	acknowledged	and	in	some	cases	(animals	or	certain	ecosystems)	their	interests	must	be	weighed	and	can	even	be	humanly	represented,	they	cannot	become	meaningful	participants	in	the	democratic	 process.	 They	 may	 have	 agentic	 capabilities,	 but	 lack	 agentic	 awareness	 and	 even	intentionality	in	the	politically	relevant	sense.	New	materialists	somehow	recognize	this	limitation,	as	they	abandon	for	a	moment	their	rejection	of	the	human/non-human	divide	in	order	to	admit,	albeit	 implicitly,	 that	 humans	 are	 exceptional:	 whereas	 Diana	 Coole	 (2013)	 suggests	 that	responsibility	is	in	itself	an	agentic	capacity	that	makes	human	beings	particularly	responsible	for	endangering	 the	planet,	William	Connolly	 (2013)	points	out	 that	humans	 think	more	profoundly	about	their	situation	than	other	species	and	thus	have	a	greater	responsibility.	It	might	then	be	the	case	 that	 only	 a	 reflective,	 self-conscious	 agency	 is	 democratically	 meaningful,	 whereas	 "raw"	agency,	while	politically	relevant,	can	hardly	be	democratized.	Still,	it	can	be	taken	into	account	and	thus	"covered"	by	a	self-conscious	ecological	democracy.		The	problem	of	the	demos	is	hardened	by	the	Anthropocene	scale.	The	absence	of	a	global	democracy	-or,	for	that	matter,	the	absence	of	democracy	in	countries	as	relevant	as	China-	makes	the	assmbling	of	 such	 demos	 even	 more	 unlikely.	 Reflecting	 upon	 the	 possibility	 of	 such	 democracy,	 Purdy	acknowledges	the	obstacle:		"To	 write	 of	 a	 'we',	 a	 polity	 that	 could	 inhabit	 and	 constitute	 such	 a	 democracy,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 the	institutions	and	shared	identities	that	would	make	it	real,	is	to	write	fiction,	imaginative	literature.	(...)	The	thing	is	to	hope	that	it	is	a	productive	fiction"	(Purdy	2015:	268).		
Productive,	 that	 is,	 in	 that	 it	 will	 gradually	 make	 ecological	 democracy	 closer	 by	 showing	 its	necessity,	by	producing	a	shared	identity	among	human	beings,	by	designing	institutions	that	might	be	built	p	one	day.	This	will	certainly	not	solve	the	problems	that	have	been	just	discussed,	but	may	contribute	to	the	democratization	of	the	Anthropocene	in	a	weaker	way,	namely,	the	one	provided	by	democracy	understood	as	a	public	conversation.		
3.	Democratizing	the	Anthropocene	(II):	
democracy	as	conversation.		An	alternative	path	for	ecological	democracy	in	the	Anthropocene	is	to	rely	on	democracy	as	public	conversation:	as	an	ongoing	debate	about	the	good	Anthropocene	that	is	not	directly	connected	to	an	institutionalized	decision-making	process.	The	public	sphere	should	thus	sustains	a	debate	about	how	to	manage	this	inherited	condition,	in	the	hope	that	this	will	help	to	politicize	the	subject.		However,	 the	 conversation	 on	 the	 good	 Anthropocene	 should	 be	 differentiated	 from	 the	unsustainability	question.	The	reason	is	that	there	is	not	an	automatic	connection	between	a	state	of	sustainability	and	a	particular	moral	type	of	socionatural	relation.	Because	it	may	very	well	be	the	case	 that	 the	 desirable	 Anthropocene	 is	 not	 the	 feasible	 Anthropocene,	 given	 how	 prone	 public	opinions	 are	 to	 ignore	 trade-offs	 and	 to	 avoid	 hard	 choices.	 That	 is	 why	 debating	 the	 good	Anthropocene	 should	 be	 separated	 from	 guaranteeing	 sustainability	 in	 a	 technocratic	 manner.	Climate	 change	makes	 for	 a	 nice	 example:	we	might	 dream	of	 a	 carbon-free	 society	where	poor	countries	become	advanced	economies,	but	may	not	have	any	idea	about	how	to	fulfill	this	vision.	In	the	meantime,	though,	it	is	imperative	to	create	some	international	regime	of	climate	mitigation	that	avoids	-or	tries	to	avoid-	a	catastrophic	increase	in	global	temperatures.	Using	Röckstrom	metaphor,	sustainable	policies	may	create	the	"safe	space"	for	deliberating	about	the	good	Anthropocene.		Besides,	 this	caution	seems	politically	 indispensable:	democratic	deliberation	does	not	guarantee	that	sustainable	policies	will	be	endorsed	if	they	clash	with	other	interests	or	values.	Although	the	ideal	of	deliberation	was	taken	in	the	past	as	an	enabler	of	sustainable	outcomes,	this	view	is	being	undermined	as	we	realize	the	rational	limitations	of	human	democratic	beings	-redescribed	now	as	affective,	biased,	post-sovereign	subjects	(see	Krause	2015).	In	the	age	of	alternative	facts	and	post-truth,	how	to	expect	that	climate	evidence	will	be	enough	to	convince	the	public	about	tthe	need	to	act	decisively	against	global	warming?		In	view	of	this,	the	"regulatory	ideal"	of	ecological	democracy	as	proposed	by	John	Dryzek	(1995)	-that	of	 "effectiveness	 in	communication	that	 trascends	the	boundary	of	 the	human	world"-	 looks	more	fragile	than	ever.	To	grant	communicative	rationality	to	non-human	actants	when	new	doubts	about	the	communicative	rationality	of	human	actors	are	emerging	seems	bitterly	ironic.	This	is	not	to	say	that	this	aim	should	be	dismissed:	signals	emanating	from	the	natural	world	should	certainly	receive	a	respectful	attention	on	the	human	side.	But	as	I	have	argued	elsewhere,	such	signals	are	either	 univocal	 and	 banal,	 pointing	 to	 a	 non-interference	 policy	 that	 would	 allow	 beings	 or	ecosystems	to	flourish,	or	equivocal	and	thus	subject	to	human	-distorted,	contested-	interpretation	(see	Arias-Maldonado	2007).	The	public	conversation	can	make	room	for	such	signals	through	those	participants	that	pay	attention	to	them,	but	formal	decision-making	processes	cannot	do	it	so	easily.	
	None	 of	 this	 sounds	 very	 "democratic"	 and	will	 hence	 be	 rejected	 by	 those	who	 denounces	 the	reduction	of	eco-politics	to	mere	managerialism.	Whereas	Swyngedow	(2013)	has	warned	against	"post-politics",	Blühdorn	(2007)	refers	to	a	"simulative	politics":	the	latter	denounces	that	liberal	environmental	policies	are	just	a	means	to	pretend	that	something	is	done	about	unsustainability,	while	the	former	attacks	the	managerial	framing	of	the	environmental	question	as	constituting	in	practice	an	abolition	of	politics.	In	a	similar	vein,	Lövbrand	et	al.	(2014)	argue	that	there	is	a	paradox	in	the	contrast	between	the	scientific	narrative	of	potential	collapse	that	the	Anthropocene	consists	of	 and	 the	 political	 narrative	 of	 managerialism	 that	 supports	 the	 continuity	 of	 the	 current	
socioeconomic	model	-one	that	they	identify	with	"the	political	economy	of	neoliberal	capitalism"	(Lövbrand	et	al.	2013:	9).	For	them,	the	solucion	lies	in	the	re-politization	of	the	Anthropocene:		"To	 re-politicize	 the	Anthropocene,	we	 argue,	means	 fostering	 a	 vibrant	public	 space	where	 the	manifold,	divergent	and	often	unpredictable	socio-ecological	relations	and	futures	can	be	exposed	and	debated.	(...)	the	Anthropocene	is	not	the	end	of	politics	but	a	social-natural	arrangement	-a	hybrid	nature/culture-	subject	to	political	contestation	and	normative	choice"	(Lövbrand	2014:	14).		Who	could	disagree?	A	pluralistic	public	sphere	is	a	necessary	precondition	of	a	democratic	society	and	 hence	 also	 of	 an	 ecological	 democracy.	 The	 problem	 lies	 in	 the	 institutionalization	 of	 such	communicative	 practices.	 Schellnhuber	 (1999)	 has	 talked	 of	 a	 cooperative	 system	 and	 also	 of	 a	'polylogue'	 (a	 dialogue	 of	many)	 that	 takes	 place	 via	 the	 Internet:	 roughly,	 the	 binary	 system	of	governance	and	informal	deliberation	that	constitutes	the	most	realistic	prospect	for	democratizing	the	Anthropocene.	Radical	 democrats	will	 not	 be	 satisfied	with	 such	 a	 loose	 system	of	 decision-making,	but	a	more	institutionalized	procedure	of	democratic	decision-making	at	that	level	is	hardly	viable.	The	 fact	 that	digital	communications	make	debating	easier	does	not	mean	that	 they	make	debate	better,	nor	that	the	outcome	of	that	conversation	is	to	be	formally	connected	to	democratic	institutions.	That	would	be	the	wrong	conclusion:	if	the	public	sphere	has	become	more	pluralistic	and	lively,	it	is	also	more	chaotic	and	less	civil	(see	Margetts	et	al.	2016).	Moreover,	there	is	a	strong	technical	side	to	the	Anthropocene	that	cannot	be	ignored.	Thus	a	difficult	balance	is	to	be	reached	between	 popular	 preferences	 and	 technical	 possibilities	 -a	 balance	 that	 only	 a	 representative	system,	complemented	with	local	participation,	seems	able	to	achieve.		Ultimately,	the	idea	that	different	Anthropocenes	should	be	debated,	lest	an	homogenous	discourse	becomes	prevalent,	does	not	differ	 from	what	was	said	earlier	about	the	sustainable	society	(see	Wissenburg	1998:	61).	That	makes	sense,	since	what	is	at	stake	does	not	change	much,	i.e.	which	kind	of	socionatural	relation	is	going	to	be	promoted.	This	is	not	to	dismiss	the	importance	of	the	Anthropocene,	but	just	to	point	out	how	the	idea	that	different	conceptions	of	the	latter	should	be	debated	 updates	 the	 sustainability	 debate.	Moreover,	 the	 goal	 of	 achieving	 a	 sustainable	 society	remains	 in	 place,	 no	 matter	 how	 much	 abused	 the	 category	 has	 been	 (see	 Blühdorn	 2016).	Sustainability	becomes	now	sustainability	in	and	for	the	Anthropocene.	But	there	is	no	theoretical	need	to	create	a	new	category	to	designate	that	what	sustainability	designates:	a	stable	socionatural	relation	 that	 can	 be	maintained	 indefinitely	 in	 the	 future.	 Surely	 the	 Anthropocene	 provides	 an	important	 shift	 in	 perspective	 by	 categorizing	 human	 beings	 as	 major	 agents	 of	 geological	 and	ecological	 change.	 But	 then	 again,	 as	 we	 saw	 above,	 it	 also	 brings	 about	 both	 a	 "deep	 time"	perspective	and	a	recognition	of	the	role	played	by	non-human	actants	and	evolutionary	processes	that	 limit	 our	 ability	 to	 just	 "re-write"	 socionatural	 relations	 at	 will.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	Anthropocene	is	like	sustainability	in	that	both	contront	us	with	widespread	indeterminacy	and	are	best	described	as	processes	than	as	final	states.		A	 theory	of	ecological	democracy	 for	 the	Anthropocene	cannot	 ignore	these	challenges	and	must	accordingly	advance	towards	a	distinction	between	technical	and	normative	concerns,	i.e.	between	the	 feasible	 and	 the	 good	 Anthropocene.	 Therefore,	 an	 emphasis	 in	 public	 conversation	 and	micropolitics	seems	advisable,	while	institutional	efforts	should	be	directed	towards	the	opening	up	of	 conversational	 settings	 that	 foster	 the	 public	 conversation	 on	 the	 subject	 and	 promote	participatory	politics	at	the	local	level.		
4.	Habitation	versus	habitability:	
a	new	framework	for	debating	the	Anthropocene.		If	 an	 ecological	 democracy	 for	 the	 Anthropocene	 is	 mostly	 a	 public	 conversation	 about	 the	Anthropocene,	that	is,	about	the	kind	of	Anthropocene	we	want	to	live	in,	I	would	like	to	suggest	that	the	distinction	between	habitation	and	habitability	provides	a	fruitful	alternative	to	the	language	of	sustainability	and	can	serve	as	a	basis	for	such	debate.	Needless	to	say,	the	quest	for	an	ecological	democracy	is	not	limited	to	this	conversation,	as	there	are	other	aspects	of	the	former	that	can	be	
pursued:	 from	environmental	regulation	to	 indigenous	empowerment	and	environmental	 justice.	But	 this	paper	 is	 focused	on	 the	challenge	 that	 the	Anthropocene	 itself	poses	 for	democracy	and	hence	for	ecological	democracy.	Hence	my	suggestion	about	the	language	of	habitation	as	one	that	befits	this	complex	and	contested	reality.		Habitation	versus	habitability:	whereas	habitation	refers	to	the	way	a	community	makes	use	of	its	environment	 in	 order	 to	 support	 its	way	 of	 life,	 habitability	 designates	 the	match	 or	mis-match	between	them		(see	Lantrip	1997).	Humans	do	not	possess	a	'natural'	way	of	life,	though:	they	have	developed	a	number	of	alternatives	that	are	expressed	in	different	patterns	of	habitability	-in	turn	shaped	by	 ideals	 of	 habitation.	 It	 could	 even	be	 said	 that	 humanity's	way	of	 being	 as	 an	 species	
contradicts	 the	 very	 idea	 that	 there	 is	 a	 natural	 'match'	 between	 a	 society	 and	 its	 environment.	Likewise,	not	every	'match'	is	feasible:	a	society	can	try	to	realize	a	given	ideal	of	habitation,	only	to	find	 that	 it	 undermines	 habitability:	 ecological	 collapse	 can	 follow	 (see	 Diamond	 2006).	Interestingly,	local	habitation	can	be	seemingly	viable,	while	the	aggregate	effect	of	several	local	or	national	communities	can	 lead	 to	patterns	of	global	un-habitability.	This	 is	 the	case	with	climate	change,	the	quintaessential	Anthropocenic	phenomenon.	Such	potential	divergence	is	of	the	utmost	importance	when	thinking	about	ecological	democracy	in	our	times.			Talking	about	modes	of	habitation	thus	involves	the	recognition	that	human	beings	relate	to	their	natural	environments	in	different	ways.	This	is	not	surprising:	socionatural	interactions	are	socially	bounded	 and	 culturally	 constrained	 -otherwise	 they	would	 be	 the	 same	 everywhere.	 Instead	 of	possessing	unique	features	irrespective	of	the	time	and	space	in	which	it	takes	place,	this	relation	varies	relatively	from	one	social	context	to	another,	so	that	different	understandings	of	nature	co-exists,	producing	different	patterns	of	 interaction	between	human	beings	and	 the	natural	world.	These	patterns	depend	on	a	complex	set	of	factors,	including	culture	and	history.	Admittedly,	a	global	socionatural	 relation	 is	 emerging,	 as	 the	 Anthropocene	 itself	 demonstrates.	 But	 two	 levels	 of	occurrence	 and	 analysis	 can	 be	 distinguished.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 universal	 fact	 of	 human	adaptation	to	nature,	which,	despite	symbiotic	and	cooperative	practices,	mostly	adopts	the	form	of	a	 culturally	 turbocharged	 niche-construction	 that	 is	 tantamount	 to	 the	 social	 re-construction	 of	nature	(see	Arias-Maldonado	2015).	On	the	other,	the	particular	circumstances	of	a	context-bound	adaptive	process	 that	 (still)	 reflects	 local	 singularities	and	 thus	produces	a	 relative	variability	 in	socionatural	patterns	of	 interaction.	At	 this	 latter	 level,	different	 ideals	of	habitation	can	make	a	difference	-by	influencing	current	modes	of	habitation.		Now,	politicizing	habitation	means	making	habitation	salient	enough,	so	that	citizens	can	become	aware	of	the	fact	that	societies	do	have	modes	of	habitation	that	involve	a	particular	treatment	of	the	non-human	world	and	a	particular	way	of	exploiting	natural	resources.	A	mode	of	habitation	can	undermine	the	habitability	of	a	society	if	it	ceases	to	be	sustainable	in	relation	to	the	conditions	that	a	given	environment	impose.	This	is	one	reason	for	politicizing	this	question	-together	with	moral	issues	concerning	the	treatment	of	non-human	beings.	Yet	what	if	that	habitability	is	not,	after	all,	threatened?	What	if	a	society	produces	the	necessary	technological	innovations	to	conjure	up	this	danger	or	adapts	to	the	changes	that	befall	it	without	substantially	changing	its	prevailing	mode	of	habitation?	In	such	a	case,	there	are	reasons	to	expect	that	making	habitation	salient	would	still	be	useful.	For	one	thing,	this	operation	seeks	to	create	an	awareness	of	the	fact	of	habitation,	that	is,	the	very	 fact	 that	 societies	 are	 inhabited	 in	 a	 certain	way,	 apparently	 reflecting	 particular	 ideals	 of	habitation.	 Ideally,	 once	 this	 is	 understood,	 citizens	 can	 choose	 between	 different	 modes	 of	habitation	-including	the	existing	one!		Interestingly,	much	as	there	exists	a	permanent	gap	between	expressed	values	and	actual	behaviors	in	 the	 environmental	 realm,	 a	 societal	 gap	 is	 also	 observable	 in	 the	 contrast	 between	 prevalent	
modes	of	habitation	in	the	developed	world	and	its	pervasive	ideals	of	habitation.	Most	people	still	hold	a	Romantic	view	of	nature	either	as	a	wilderness	to	be	in	touch	with	or	as	a	garden	where	is	worthwhile	living	-or	both.	Yet	we	live	in	a	hypertechnological	society	where	natural	resources	are	methodically	 exploited	 and	 biodiversity	 is	 plummeting.	 This	 contradiction	 should	 also	 be	made	
salient,	in	what	clearly	constitutes	a	political	task	that	only	an	ecological	democracy	-a	conversation	on	our	ecological	conditions-	seems	able	to	perform.		Laclau's	(1990)	conception	of	the	political	can	be	helpful	 in	this	context.	He	dwells	on	Husserl	to	make	a	distinction	between	the	social	and	the	political:	the	former	consists	in	forgetting	the	acts	or	decisions	of	"originary	institution"	of	the	social	order,	whereas	the	latter	requires	the	reactivation	of	the	contingent	moment	of	foundation,	thus	disclosing	the	potential	for	different	constructions	of	that	order.	This	happens	because	social	structures	and	collective	norms	are	sedimented	and	thus	taken	as	'natural';	the	political	reveals	them	as	contingent.	For	Laclau,	the	frontier	between	the	social	and	 the	 political	 is	 essentially	 unstable.	 It	 requires	 constant	 displacements	 and	 renegotiations	between	social	agents	that	seeks	to	'naturalize'	their	preferred	social	order.	The	ensuing	conflict	can	take	many	forms	-from	collective	mobilization	to	framing	battles	in	the	public	sphere,	from	electoral	competition	to	social	upheavals.	He	is	thus	giving	an	explicit	political	meaning	to	genealogies,	in	the	Nietzschean	sense:	researching	the	true	origins	of	social	norms	and	practices	(Nietzsche	1988).	In	his	own	words:		"To	reveal	the	original	meaning	of	an	act,	then,	is	to	reveal	the	moment	of	its	radical	contingency	–	in	other	words,	to	reinsert	it	in	the	system	of	real	historic	options	that	were	discarded	(...)	by	showing	the	terrain	of	original	violence,	of	the	power	relation	through	which	that	instituting	act	took	place"	(Laclau	1990:	34).		It	is	thus	an	unveiling	operation	that	can	shed	light	on	current	social	configurations.	Yet	a	genealogy	of	habitation	in	the	Anthropocene	should	go	beyond	the	classical	green	framing	-according	to	which	human	beings	 have	 alienated	 themselves	 from	nature	 by	 dominating	 it-	 in	 order	 to	 explain	 in	 a	realistic	fashion	why	and	how	the	current	modes	of	habitation	are	firmly	in	place	and	why	are	they	so	different	 from	 the	Romantic	 ideals	of	habitation	 that	pervade	Western	 cultures.	Developing	a	genealogy	 of	 habitation	 thus	 involves	 the	 recognition	 that	 human	 adaptation	 is	 not	 a	 choice	 but	rather	a	necessity,	as	well	as	identifying	those	aspects	of	human	adaptation	to	the	environment	that	could	 not	 have	 been	 much	 different	 (dominating	 other	 species,	 exploiting	 natural	 resources,	migrating	to	other	territories,	and	so	on).	In	sum,	there	is	an	unintentional	side	to	habitation	that	must	be	emphasized,	so	that	alternative	ideals	-as	it	is	the	case	with	the	Romantic	or	Arcadian	one-	can	be	weighed	more	realistically.	 If,	as	Sloterdijk	(2010:	60)	claims,	a	genealogical	 investigation	allows	 us	 to	 distinguish	 between	 'good'	 and	 'bad'	 origins,	 a	 genealogy	 of	 habitation	 in	 the	Anthropocene	 must	 be	 careful	 in	 identifying	 pure	 contigencies	 from	 bare	 necessities	 within	socionatural	history.		Therefore,	the	first	task	of	an	ecological	democracy	might	just	be	the	ecologization	of	democracy,	namely,	 the	rising	of	 the	public	awareness	about	 the	Anthropocene	 itself	and	the	need	to	debate	about	both	the	desirable	and	the	feasible	versions	of	it.	To	such	end,	sustainability,	with	its	emphasis	on	survival	and	resources,	may	not	provide	the	best	grammar	-as	it	does	not	emphasize	enough	the	normative	aspects	of	the	good	Anthropocene.	Hence	the	potential	usefulness	of	habitation,	which	additionally	should	help	us	to	distinguish	between	the	intentional	and	unintentional,	as	well	as	the	necessary	and	contingent	aspects	of	the	human	transformation	of	the	environment.		
5.	Conclusion.		How	does	the	coming	of	the	Anthropocene	affect	the	concept	and	prospects	of	ecological	democracy?	This	 paper	 has	 tried	 to	 answer	 this	 question,	 arguing	 that	 the	Anthropocene	 is	 a	 difficult,	 if	 not	downright	 impossible,	 democratic	 object.	 Ecological	 democracy	 has	 been	 understood	 as	 a	democracy	for	the	Anthropocene,	namely,	a	collective	process	of	decision-making	that	targets	the	latter	 -as	 opposed	 to	 an	 ecological	 democracy	 that	 pursues	 other	 environmental	 goals	 in	 the	Anthropocene,	be	them	ecosystem	restoration	or	extended	citizen	participation.		A	distinction	has	been	made	between	two	conceptions,	or	aspects,	of	democracy:	democracy	as	a	decision-making	device	and	democracy	as	a	conversation	about	the	public	good.	Both	are	informally	connected	 in	 representative	 democracies,	 since	 the	 process	 by	 which	 public	 opinion	 is	 formed	
sustains	the	process	by	which	political	decisions	are	taken.	As	far	as	the	Anthropocene	is	concerned,	democracy	as	decision	present	a	number	of	problems	regarding	sovereignity	(since	the	democratic	ability	to	make	meaningful	and	effective	decisions	on	the	Anthropocene	itself	is	limited	due	to	the	latter's	nature),	scale	(as	a	global	phenomenon	it	requires	a	global	democracy	that	is	not	even	in	the	making)	and	agency	(given	that	the	Anthropocene,	that	involves	large-scale	natural	processes	and	a	deep-time	 perspective,	 can	 only	 be	 explained	 by	 enlarging	 our	 understanding	 of	 agency,	incorporating	actors	and	forces	that	 in	turn	cannot	belong	to	the	demos).	However,	 this	does	not	mean	that	making	democratic	decisions	about	the	Anthropocene	is	impossible	or	useless.	It	simply	attests	 how	 difficult	 it	 is	 to	 answer	 to	 it	 in	 a	 collective	 and	 concerted	way,	 suggesting	 that	 our	expectations	about	ecological	democracy	in	the	Anthropocene	should	be	limited.		Democracy	as	conversation	is	more	promising.	From	this	viewpoint,	the	public	debate	would	be	the	place	to	start,	as	an	ecological	democracy	cannot	even	be	started	without	enough	public	concern	about	its	object.	For	radical	democrats,	this	is	far	from	satisfying.	Yet	the	lack	of	a	demos	and	in	fact	the	absence	of	global	democratic	institutions	make	this	other	path	a	more	realistic	way	of	politicizing	and	 democratizing	 the	 Anthropocene.	 This	 public	 conversation	 runs	 parallel	 to	 a	 system	 of	environmental	 governance	 and	 ideally	 nurtures	 him.	 Yet	 the	 Great	 Recession	 and	 the	 rise	 of	populism	show	how	secondary	environmental	concerns	may	be	in	the	face	of	"materialist"	worries.	At	the	same	time,	sustainability	and	desiderability	should	be	separated:	the	good	Anthropocene	is	one	thing,	the	sustainable	Anthropocene	another.	The	reason	is	that	we	can	be	sustainable	in	the	Anthropocene	in	different,	albeit	not	endless,	ways.	In	this	vein,	I	have	suggested	that	the	language	of	habitation	may	be	a	useful	alternative	to	develop	an	ecological	democracy	in	the	Anthropocene,	as	it	hihglights	the	very	fact	that	human	beings	inhabit	their	environments	in	different	ways	and	in	ways	that	can	be	changed,	at	least	to	some	extent.		All	 in	 all,	 the	 Anthropocene	 is	 such	 a	 difficult	 object	 for	 democracy	 that	 expectations	 about	 its	democratization	must	be	kept	 low.	Although	it	will	always	exhibit	a	great	potential,	an	ecological	democracy	for	the	Anthropocene	looks	inescapably	post-sovereign,	as	humans	themselves	after	the	affective	turn	in	social	sciences	do.	Only	time	will	tell	whether	the	public	environmental	concerns	grows	enough	to	turn	our	shaky	liberal	democracies	into	ecological	democracies	able	to	meet	the	formidable	societal	challenge	posed	by	the	Anthropocene.			
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